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Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), an economically attractive and environmental friendly fuel is the 
current energy alternative across the globe. Its market potential and high demand is felt currently 
in the Indian subcontinent as well. Government and private players are seriously getting into this 
energy option and establishing many LNG facilities on the west and east coast of India. While 
establishing in this new energy sector it is vital to identify and analyse the safety hazards likely 
to affect public and environment. LNG being a flammable chemical, loss of its containment 
manifests to consequences in terms of fire, explosion and other impacts. There are several 
methods currently available to carry out the risk analysis of such projects. LOPA is a quick and 
simple technique applied to determine the risk by estimate consequence frequencies. But 
application of LOPA becomes constrained when failures are compound and safety systems are 
integrated. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was integrated into LOPA to eliminate this draw back. 
FTA was used to find out the probability of failure on demand (PFD) of integrated protection 
layers. This FTA-LOPA integrated approach was used as an effective tool in this work to study 
hazard potentials and estimate the consequences due to such hazards. Based on the technical 
specifications provided and description of the work, the LOC scenarios are identified in the 




Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a convenient form of energy, which may play an important role 
in the  global energy  sector especially in the gas industry in the future. The predicted average 
consumption of natural gas is increasing 1.3 percent every year [1, 2]. Liquefied Natural Gas is a 
clear, colorless, non-toxic liquid that forms when natural gas is cooled to -1620C. LNG is a clean 
and environmental friendly fuel when compared to other fuels [3].The liquefaction of natural gas 
raised the possibility of its transportation to distant destinations. LNG is made at a liquefaction 
plant and transported in ships, safely and efficiently. When LNG reaches the destination, it is 
returned to gas by regasification facilities. It is then piped to homes, businesses and industries. 
LNG is a mixture of gases such as methane, ethane, propane, nitrogen and various other minor 
components based on the sources of natural gas [4]. Methane is the predominant component of 
LNG and hence the properties of LNG are more or less same as that of methane. LNG can 
expand to 600 times its volume when converted into vapour. This property of LNG is used in the 
economical storage and transportation of compressed gas in the form of Liquefied natural gas 
[4,5]. LNG is a cryogenic liquid and its boiling point ranges from -157oC to -166 oC  [4,5]. Based 
on the composition of LNG, density of LNG varies from 430 to 470 kg /m3 [5]. It is very 
economical to transport LNG through pipelines from the gas fields to the end users [5,6].  
 
LNG is a hazardous substance. The hazardous nature of LNG is due to its cryogenic temperature, 
possible asphyxiation and other risk such as fire and explosion. Frostbite may occur, if persons 
contact with liquid LNG [4].  Prolonged exposure of LNG vapour may cause damage to the 
lungs. Embrittlement of materials like carbon steel and rubber are also considered as the 
secondary hazards of LNG. This secondary hazard may cause cracks in the storage tanks and 
leakage of LNG, which may result in primary hazards like fire and explosion [4]. The 
flammability limit of LNG is 5- 15% by volume in air [4]. 
 
Though LNG is convenient, economical and environment friendly, the societal acceptability of 
LNG regasification facilities depends on safe operations of such plant. Extensive researches are 
necessary to bring the risk associated with LNG operations as low as reasonably practicable. For 
this purpose, appropriate and in depth safety analyses should be performed in these types of 
industries [4, 5, 7]. Qualitative and quantitative hazard analyses are essential for identification 
and quantification hazards associated with LNG industries. No single technique can identify or 
quantify all of the safety concerns. However, the process of risk assessment can be achieved 
through a systematic approach using a combination of different techniques [8].  In this work both 
FTA and LOPA are used in the integrated form. 
 
Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) is a powerful analytical tool for assessing the adequacy of 
protection layers used to mitigate the risk involved in the process. It is a semi quantitative 
analysis of hazards that evaluates the frequency of the cause/s and the probability of failure of 
the protective layers.  It was developed to determine the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of Safety 
Instrumented Functions (SIF) [9].  
 
LOPA is based on the concept of protective layers. In order to prevent the occurrence of an 
undesired consequence, a protection barrier is implemented. If this barrier works well, no more 
protection layers are required. However, there is no perfect protection barrier and several are 
needed to reduce the risk to tolerable levels. LOPA is useful to reduce the risk of a process to a 
tolerable level through the analysis of independent protection layers (IPLs). IPLs satisfy the 
criteria of specificity, independence, dependability and auditability. CCPS [9] provides the 
required characteristics for IPLs as independence, Functionality, Integrity, Reliability, 
Auditability, Success surety and Management of change. Examples of IPLs are controls, alarms, 
Procedures, training and safety instrumented functions. 
 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a powerful diagnostic technique used widely for demonstrating the 
root causes of undesired events in a system using logical, functional relationship among 
components, manufacturing process, and subsystems [10,11,12]. 
 
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) 
 
The Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) method is a Process Hazard Analysis tool. The 
method utilizes the hazardous events, event severity, initiating causes and initiating likelihood 
data developed during the Hazard and Operability analysis (HAZOP) [13, 14]. The LOPA 
method allows the user to determine the risk associated with the various hazardous events by 
utilizing their severity and the likelihood of the events being initiated. Using corporate risk 
standards, the user can determine the total amount of risk reduction required and analyse the risk 
reduction that can be achieved from various layers of protection. If additional risk reduction is 
required after the reduction provided by process design, the basic process control system 
(BPCS), alarms and associated operator actions, pressure relief valves, etc., a Safety 
Instrumented Function (SIF) may be required [9]. The safety integrity level (SIL) of the SIF can 
be determined directly from the additional risk reduction required.  
 
LOPA is a semi quantitative technique which provides results with less time and effort than other 
QRAs. For LOPA application failure data are essential to compute the consequence frequencies. 
One limitation is that failure data required for a LOPA are generally available for component 
failures and human error failures [15], although many failure are so complex that there are 
multiple combinations of these basic failures. Secondly, in LOPA protection systems are taken as 
independent layer of protection (IPL) which satisfies conditions independent, dependable, 
auditable as per CCPS. [9,16,17]. 
 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault Tree Analysis is a deductive technique. The purpose of FTA is to identify the combination 
of equipment failure and human errors that can result in an incident. FTA is often employed in 
situations where another hazard evaluation technique has pinpointed an incident that requires 
more analysis [6,18]. FTA is also used widely in many fields, such as semiconductor industry 
[12], man-machine system [19], flexible manufacturing systems [11], nuclear power plants [20] 
transmission pipelines [6], chemical industries [10, 21] and LNG terminal emergency shut down 
systems [22]. Shu et al., [23] applied fuzzy set theory for fault tree analysis on the printed circuit 
board industry. Refaul et al., [24] developed computer aided fuzzy fault tree analysis. Doytcin 
and Gerd [25] combined task analysis with fault tree analysis for accident and incident analysis. 
In many cases there are multiple causes for an accident or other loss making event. It can be used 
in accident investigation and in a detailed hazard assessment. The fault tree is a logic diagram 
based on the principle of multi causality, which traces all branches of events which could 
contribute to an accident or failure. It uses set of symbols, labels, and identifiers. The fault tree is 
a graphical model which uses different logic gates and event symbols.  
 
FTA is a very effective risk assessment tool, but when it comes to a reasonably complex system, 
that includes a large number of equipment and process variables, the fault tree becomes 
enormous and takes quite of a time to be completed. The concept of partial failure in a fault tree 
does not exist. If the equipment is partially working it is considered as fully unavailable or in 
failure mode. This partial failure changes the reliability of a system, but the FTA has no effect of 
such condition in its results. If a fault tree is developed by different safety professionals, it will 
be of different nature depending on the developer. The  probability  calculation  for  a  top  event,  
failure data of all the events in the fault tree that are usually not  known  or  not  accurately  
known decreases  the credibility of the analysis. On the other hand, the biggest advantage of 
using FTA is that it starts from a top event that is selected by the user for a specific interest and 
the tree developed will identify the root cause.  The  FTA  has  the  ability  to  be  used  with a 
computer and  generate  results  using computer application for improved analysis [18]. 
 
LOPA – FTA Integrated Approach 
 
LOPA is a quick semi quantitative technique which provides results with less time and effort 
than other QRAs. For LOPA application failure data are essential to compute the consequence 
frequencies. One limitation is that failure data required for a LOPA are generally available for 
component failure and human error failure [13, 16], although many failure are so complex that 
there are multiple combinations of these basic failures. So it becomes extremely difficult to apply 
the conventional LOPA method. Secondly, in LOPA protection systems are taken as independent 
layer of protection (IPL) which satisfies conditions independent, dependable, auditable as per 
[17]. But in many cases the criteria of independence is not satisfied as protection layers are 
integrated or coincides with one another. It will be difficult to apply LOPA in the above 
scenarios [26]. Fault tree analysis (FTA) can be integrated into LOPA to eliminate the above 
mentioned drawback. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a widely used tool for system safety analysis 
[23, 27]. It is a deductive (backward reasoning) logic technique that focuses on one particular 
hazardous event (e.g. Toxic gas release, explosion, fire, etc.) and provides a method for 
determining the causes of hazardous events. The basic process in the technique of FTA is to 
identify a particular effect or outcome from the system and trace backward into the system by the 
logical sequence to prime cause(s) of this effect [6, 27]. This helps in analysing complex failures. 
But using FTA for analysing an entire process is Herculean task. So FTA application is limited 
to PFD calculations. Again, if pre-solved fault trees could be used by the analyst those can be 
inserted into LOPA even faster computing of consequence frequency. FTA when integrated into 
LOPA can be used in complex systems and integrated layer of protections. This improves 
versatility of LOPA as a risk assessment tool without losing its swiftness and simplicity. 
 
Case study Result and discussions 
 
Geun Woong Yun [28] published the HAZOP work sheets for LNG terminal operations as 
Appendix B in his master thesis.  He has also identified seven scenarios for LOPA study and 
presented in his thesis. He has used different database such as EIReDA, ORECDA and LNG 
plant failure rate database collected from LNG facilities. He has classified all these data into two 
groups in the form look up tables, one for PFDs of IPLs and other for initiating event frequency. 
In this work LOPA –FTA integrated approach is used for the LOPA analysis of the scenario 
identified by Geun Woong Yun.  In this paper all seven scenarios are presented for 
demonstrating the   LOPA-FTA integrated approach for calculation of PFDs of IPL.  Some 




Initiating event  Loading arm failure due to flange joint or swivel joint 
Frequency of initiating event  22.75 10x −  per year  
IPL 1 Gas detector at jetty & human intervention 









Figure 2 Estimation of PFD of IPL2 using FTA for scenario  1 
 
 
Frequency of consequence = Initiating event frequency x Total PFD 
 
         = 22.75 10x − x 66.77 10x −  
 





Initiating event  Pressure increase of unloading arm due to BV-1 failed  
closure during unloading 
Frequency of initiating event  35.51 10x −  per year  
IPL 1 Temperature safety motor operated valve (TMSO) system 
 
 
Figure 3 Estimation of PFD of IPL using FTA for scenario 2 
 
 
Frequency of consequence = Initiating event frequency x Total PFD 
 
         = 35.51 10x − x 47.52 10x −  
 




Initiating event  HP pump cavitation and damage due to low pressure of the 
recondensor resulting from BV – 32 failed closure ( 
Possible leakage and fire) 
Frequency of initiating event  35.51 10x −  per year  
IPL 1 Low pressure alarm 
IPL2 HP pump tripping 
Note Low pressure sensor which activates tripping circuit  for Hp 
pump and same pump also send signal to control room  for 





Figure 4 Estimation of PFD of IPL using FTA for scenario 3 
 
 
Frequency of consequence = Initiating event frequency x Total PFD 
 
         = 35.51 10x − x 22.62 10x −  
 






Initiating event  High temperature in recondensor due to more BOG input 
resulting from FCV-33 spurious full open. ( Possible 
cavitation and damage of HP pump leading to leakage) 
Frequency of initiating event  35.77 10x −  per year  
IPL 1 High temperature alarm and human intervention 





Figure 5 Estimation of PFD of IPL1 using FTA for scenario 4 
 
 
Figure 6 Estimation of PFD of IPL using FTA for scenario 4 
 
 
Frequency of consequence = Initiating event frequency x Total PFD 
 
         = 35.77 10x − x 41.61 10x −  
 




Initiating event  Over pressure in the tank due to roll over resulting from 
stratification and possible damage due to tank 
Frequency of initiating event  21.5 10x −  per year  
IPL 1 Density monitoring and jet mixing using FCV 
IPL2 High Pressure alarm and trip inlet line valve (EMOV) 



















Figure 9 Estimation of PFD of IPL using FTA for scenario 5 
 
 
Frequency of consequence = Initiating event frequency x Total PFD 
 
         = 21.5 10x − x 94.5 10x −  
 




Initiating event  LNG level increases and leads to carry over into annular 
space because operator line up the wrong tank. (possible 
overpressure in the tank) 
Frequency of initiating event  23.52 10x −  per year  
IPL 1 Two level alarms and human intervention 














Frequency of consequence = Initiating event frequency x Total PFD 
 
         = 23.53 10x − x 41.64 10x −  
 




Initiating event  Under pressure in tank due to pump-out without BOG input 
resulting from BV-45 failed closure. 
Frequency of initiating event  35.52 10x −  per year  
IPL 1 Low pressure alarm and BOG compressor trip 
IPL 2 Low pressure detector and LP pump trip 













Figure 14 Estimation of PFD of IPL using FTA scenario for 7 
 
 
Frequency of consequence = Initiating event frequency x Total PFD 
 
         = 35.5 10x − x 127.26 10x −  
 


















 LOPA is  a simplified form of risk assessment tool for  prioritising hazardous scenarios and 
making risk based decisions. FTA is one of the many quantitative hazard quantification tools 
used extensively to assess the  safety and reliability of the complex systems. LOPA is inadequate 
in dealing with  compound failures. LOPA cannot give  proper results when the failures are not 
independent. FTA can evaluate interdependant and coumpound failures. LOPA is very quick and 
simple, whereas  FTA is complex and  time consuming. Both LOPA and FTA have their own 
weakness. But if  we integrate these two, we could avoid the limitations of LOPA in dealing with  
compound failures and  dependent failures. In this paper an attempt has been made to implement 
FTA- LOPA integrated approach to LNG terminals. The above method may be  applied to 
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